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ABSTRACT
Penetration Testing emerged in the mid-1960s as an approach to exploit vulnerabilities
of possible attacks of a software application by nefarious users. Traditional penetration
testing is done manually, which is not only inefficient but also unstable in terms of reliability.
In the recent decade, multiple automated penetration testing approaches have been proposed,
including automatically test inputs generation based on genetic algorithms and neural
networks learning. However, these black-box testing methods only have limited accuracy,
and usually require a large number of data to train the agents before they can be used to
do actual tests. To address this issue, we present a novel approach in which program static
analysis is exploited. The proposed penetration testing system is able to not only estimate
HTTP request data more precisely, but also discover dynamic interfaces exposed by the web




As the scale of enterprise web applications grows rapidly, finding an effective way for testing
site reliability is becoming increasingly important. As a widely-used testing technique,
penetration testing is able to exploit the vulnerabilities of a web application back-end by
simulating sending HTTP requests from the client side. Since penetration testing is used to
test as many parts of an application as possible, comprehensiveness is the most important
factor in performing penetration testing. An ideal penetration test is the one that generates
HTTP requests which cover 100% of the server-side code.
Traditionally, penetration tests are performed as black-box testing, which views the
program to be tested as a ”black box” whose implementation detail is unknown to the tester.
Black-box testing allows the tester to focus on only the input and the output generated by
the program; however, since the inner functionality of the program is unknown, it is difficult
for the tester to generate a comprehensive test suite that guarantees 100% back-end code
coverage. In traditional manual penetration testing, a tester could only apply ”educated
guesses” when creating test requests. Some recent research proposed automated penetration
testing using AI techniques such as genetic algorithm [1] and neural network models [2].
Although these automated approaches showed promising results in some scenarios, by
nature they are still black-box testing, only improving the accuracy of ”educated guess”
by inferring from the statistical analysis results generated from the differences between
expected outputs and actual outputs.
The lack of comprehensiveness and efficiency in black-box penetration testing prompted
us to propose a new approach that performs white-box testing, during which tests are
performed by looking at the implementation details in the source code of the program itself.
In our implementation, both the interfaces that an application exposes and all the request
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data that is processed in the back-end can be inferred from static analysis results. The test
suite goes through the program and checks at what positions each HTTP request variable
is used. If some other variables are involved at any of the positions, then the program will
use the result of data flow analysis to construct the exact value for such variables, which
are also the possible values that the HTTP request variable could take. The test suite uses a
library developed by Christensen, Møller, and Schwartzbach [3] to construct an automaton
that represents possible string values during string variable construction.
As another major part of penetration testing, interface discovering was traditionally done
by doing web crawling. However, since modern web frontend is becoming increasingly
dynamic, only extracting information from the client-side HTML pages does not guarantee
enough interfaces are discovered. In 2007, Halfond and Orso [4] proposed a novel approach
for discovering web application interfaces using static analysis. Such technique showed
promising results for finding and grouping dynamic interfaces that are not exposed directly
by the front-end. In this project, the same algorithms proposed by Halfond et al. is applied






In compiler theory, data-flow analysis is a technique for gathering information about the
possible set of values calculated at various points in a computer program. The basis for
performing data-flow analysis is control flow graph (CFG), which is used to determine those
parts of the program to which a particular value assigned to a variable might propagate. In
our particular case, we used reaching-definition for each instruction to represent the data
flow information. Two techniques applied for performing reaching-definition analysis are
Liveness Analysis and Reaching-Def Analysis.
Control Flow Graph (CFG) is a graph representation of all the paths that a computer
program might be traversed through during its execution. In a control flow graph, each
node represents a basic block - a sequential piece of a program that does not include jumps
or jump targets, while the directed edges represent jumps in the program. Figure 2.1 is
the complete control flow graph constructed for an example function t3f1. Each circle
represents a basic block (first number in the circle denotes its line number), and the black
edges represent the possible jumps that the program can take during execution. It is worth
noting that the while loop in t3f1 includes a condition check at line 4, which can be reached
from either line 4 (before loop starts) or from line 13 (after last instruction in the loop is
finished). Therefore in the CFG there are two nodes representing line 5, with one coming
from line 4 and another coming from line 13.
3
Figure 2.1: Control Flow Graph for Function t3f1
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1 <?php
2 f u n c t i o n t 3 f 1 ( $c , $d ) {
3 $a = 0 ;
4 $b = 0 ;
5 whi le ( $a <= 5)
6 {
7 i f ( $b > 5) {
8 $b = 5 ;
9 }
10 $a = $a + 1 ;




As one of the two techniques used for performing reaching-definition analysis, liveness
analysis is to calculate, at instruction level, the variables that may be potentially read before
their next write, that is, the variables that are live at the exit from each program point. In the
given example, variable b is first defined at line 4; it is also defined at line 8 and 11 in the
main loop. Therefore, var b is said to be ”alive” from line 4 to line 8, and from line 11 back
to line 8. Given liveness analysis output, def-use chains can be constructed for each variable.
The DU chain represents the exact places where a variable definition is later used in other
instructions. The DU chains in t3f1 are shown as black dotted edges in Figure 2.1.
To the contrary of liveness analysis, reaching-def analysis calculates the possible defi-
nition instructions for a given use variable. Reaching-def analysis helps generate use-def
chains for each variable used in a program. The UD chains for variables in t3f1 are shown
as red dotted edges in Figure 2.1.
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2.1.2 HipHop VM and HipHop Bytecode
HipHop Virtual Machine (HHVM) is an open-source virtual machine based on just-in-time
(JIT) compilation that serves as an execution engine for the PHP and Hack programming
languages. During HHVM execution, PHP or Hack code is first transformed into an
intermediate code format, HipHip bytecode (HHBC), for the consumption by JIT compilers
[5]. We found HHBC an ideal code representation for PHP programs, because unlike PHP
native statements, which only describes what actions to perform, HHBC is consisted by
instructions, which tell the machine how those actions should be performed. Specifically,
declare, load and set operations for variables are explicitly stated in HHBC, which makes it
easy to build CFGs and perform data analysis. Moreover, HHBC introduces the concept
of ”execution stack”, a stack space upon which data are processed by pushing and popping
according to different operations. Such concept could greatly help with the string analysis
that we use for testcase generation, which will be discussed in 2.3.1.
2.2 Inter-procedural CFG Construction
Usually during static analysis, an intra-procedural CFG is constructed for each individual
function before all intra-procedural CFGs are combined into one inter-procedural CFG
(ICFG) that represents the control flow for the entire program. ICFG is a combination of
all individual functions and a function call graph (CG), which is a graph representation
of function dependencies in a program, in which functions are represented as nodes and
function invocations are represented as directed edges. Since one variable defined/used in
any function can be used/defined in other functions, extra work needs to be done in order to
expand a variable’s DU and UD chains in ICFG. Algorithm 1 shows the construction of DU
and UD chains in ICFG given individual CFGs and CG.
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Algorithm 1 Dataflow Expansion in ICFG
Require:
1: CG: call graph of the application program;
2: CFGS: CFGs for all functions in the program
. main
3: procedure DATAFLOW EXPANSION
4: visited← ∅
5: for Each CFG in CFGS do
6: for Each instruction I in CFG do
7: if I has KILL variable kv then





13: for Each CFG in CFGS do
14: for Each instruction I in CFG do
15: if I has GEN variable gv then





21: function COMPLETEDEFUSE(cfg, instr, var, visited)
22: if instr in visited then
23: return instr.duchain
24: end if
25: for Each Use use in instr.duchain do
26: if use is a function call site then
27: Get the callee function targetfunction
28: Get the function parameter targetvar in targetfunction that corresponds
to use.var
29: Get the instruction targetInstr that initiates targetvar in targetfunction
30: newuses ← COMPLETEDEFUSE(targetfunction.CFG, targetInstr,
targetvar, visited)
31: instr.duchain← (instr.duchain - use) ∪ newuses
32: end if
33: end for




37: function COMPLETEUSEDEF(cfg, instr, var, visited)
38: if instr in visited then
39: return instr.udchain
40: end if
41: for Each Def def in instr.udchain do
42: if def is a function entry site then
43: Get all the functions callerfuncs that calls current function
44: for Each function callerfunc in callerfuncs do
45: Get the function parameter sourcevar in callerfunc that corresponds
to def.var
46: Get the instruction sourceInstr in callerfunc that passes sourcevar
to callee stack
47: newdefs ← COMPLETEUSEDEF(callerfunc.CFG, sourceInstr,
sourcevar, visited)




52: visited← visited ∪ instr
53: return instr.duchain
54: end function
2.3 Testcase Generation Algorithm
2.3.1 Precise String Analysis for Input Generation
Typically, users interact with a web application through a user interface (e.g., web page) that
allows them to enter input data (e.g., into a form) and submit such data to the web application
via HTTP request. The data that users enter are mostly in string literal forms (e.g., name,
address, email, etc). Therefore, generating appropriate string inputs automatically during
penetration testing is of our particular interest.
The most direct and effective approach for generating test string literal inputs is to check
what values the input variable is compared with during input validation in the application
back-end. Usually after the application receives a request from the client side, it will
compare each input field against some specific values or regular expressions, in order to
check if the value is valid, or to process data differently according to the given value. For
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string literal fields, the checker strings/regex are particularly useful, because they provide a
good reference for generating our test inputs (the testcase generator only needs to make the
input value either match the given value or differ from it). Therefore, in order to generate
our test inputs, the fundamental step is to construct the string literals or regular expressions
that the inputs are compared with in the application.
Conventional static analysis does not try to get the information of what the value of a
variable exactly is. However, in order for our testcase generation tool to construct more
plausible input string literals, it is important to estimate the exact value of string literals used
to compare with inputs passed into the application. Fortunately, the structure of HipHop
Bytecode makes it possible to perform such action. The compiled HHBC for a PHP program
models the flow of program execution by using a stack of frames referred to as the ”call
stack”. Each call stack maintains an ”evaluation stack”, on which data is pushed or popped
based on type of HHBC instruction. By using a stack data structure to model this evaluation
stack, along with the data flow analysis results that the earlier phase generates, we can
partially simulate the actual program’s behavior during execution, which is sufficient for us
to construct exact string literal values.
Listing 2.1 shows a simple PHP program that uses a create name function to build full
names from first and last names. In line 3, first name is first concatenated with a space
and then concatenated with last name. Listing 2.2 is the HHBC generated for line 3 after
compilation, which shows how the act of concatenation in line 3 is performed by HHVM.
HHVM starts the series of actions by declaring a String (a space) (line 152), which is pushed
to the evaluation stack; next, HHVM looks for the variable with ID 0 (CGetL2 0 in line
157), and pushes it onto the stack; then, when it comes to the ”Concat” instruction, HHVM
takes the top two elements from the stack, append the topmost value (which is the space) to
the back of the second topmost value (the variable with ID 0), and pushes the result onto the
stack, thus completing the first concatenation. The rest of the HHVM actions are similar to
what have happened: HHVM pushes the variable with ID 1 to the stack, pops the top two
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elements, concatenates them, and finally pushes the result to the stack.
Listing 2.1: Sample PHP Code and Compiled HHBC Snippet
1 <?php
2 f u n c t i o n c r e a t e n a m e ( $a , $b ) {
3 r e t u r n $a . ” ” . $b ;
4 }
5 $ f i r s t n a m e 1 = ” John ” ;
6 $ l a s t n a m e 1 = ”Doe” ;
7 $ f i r s t n a m e 2 = ” George ” ;
8 $ l a s t n a m e 2 = ” B u r d e l l ” ;
9 $name1 = c e a t e n a m e ( $ f i r s t n a m e 1 , $ l a s t n a m e 1 ) ;
10 $name2 = c r e a t e n a m e ( $ f i r s t n a m e 2 , $ l a s t n a m e 2 ) ;
11 $n = $ POST [ ”name” ] ;
12 i f ( $n == $name1 ) {
13 echo ”You a r e a UGA s t u d e n t ” ;
14 } e l s e i f ( $n == $name2 ) {
15 echo ”You a r e a Georg i a Tech s t u d e n t ” ;
16 } e l s e {
17 echo ” F a i l e d ” ;
18 }
19 ?>
Listing 2.2: HHBC Snippet for line 3
1 152 : S t r i n g ” ”
2 157 : CGetL2 0
3 159 : Concat
4 160 : CGetL 1
5 162 : Concat
6 163 : RetC
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Given the fact that HHBC instructions also represent stack operations, we can take
advantage of such property to build the string literal by mocking HHVM stack operations.
In our implementation, a global stack data structure is maintained by the static analyzer.
After each basic block is created, all the instructions in the basic block are simulated to
work on the stack. The result is an ActionNode tree. ActionNode is a data structure that
represents the specific HHVM ”Action” performed by the given instruction. For example,
”Concat” and ”String” instructions represent ”Concatenation” and ”Declaration” actions
respectively. Different type of ActionNode. Essentially each instruction should correspond
to an action node and different instruction operators should be represented by distinct action
nodes. However, given the large number of PHP string operations, we only implemented
ActionNodes for certain commonly used operations (Table 2.2). ActionTree is a hierarchical
representation of ActionNode actions upon each other. In the HHBC sample given by








As shown in the tree diagram above, Concat ActionNode always has two children, while
Get ActionNode has one child, and Declare ActionNode has zero. Different ActionNodes
have different number of children, depending on their specific actions.
In the last step, static analyzer uses the action trees and a modified Java String Analyzer
(JSA) library to construct string literal values. Java String Analyzer (JSA) [4] is a tool that
uses static analysis information to predict the possible values of string expressions in Java
programs. JSA is consisted of several phases, each transforming the program into a different
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form. The phases are separated into two parts: The front-end and the back-end. At the
front-end, JSA performs Java language specific static analysis and generates a Flow Graph
for each string expression; at the back-end, JSA takes Flow Graphs as its input and converts
them in to finite-state automata.
Flow Graph is language-independent, and can be constructed directly from data flow
analysis(liveness and reaching-def analysis). Therefore, in our implementation, the static
analyzer uses Def-Use chains and Use-Def chains along with the action trees to build flow
graph for each string expression; the flow graph is then fed into the back-end of JSA library,
which will take care the rest of string analysis and generate a finite-state automaton to
represent the string expression.
Algorithm 2 Flow Graph Construction Algorithm
Require:
1: CG: Call graph of the application program
2: ICFGS: Inter-procedural CFG with complete Def-Use and Use-Def chains
. main
3: procedure FLOW GRAPH CONSTRUCTION
4: Group functions in CG into Strongly Connected Components sccGraph
5: Get the topological ordering of SCCs, sccList , in sccGraph
6: continue← true
7: until continue is false repeat
8: for Each SCC scc in sccList do
9: for Each Function function in scc do
10: cfg← function.cfg
11: for Each BasicBlock block in cfg.getTopologicalSortedBlocks do
12: success← STRINGANALYSIS(block, ICFG)









21: function STRINGANALYSIS(basicblock, ICFG)
22: Build ActionTrees trees from basicblock.instructions
23: for Each ActionTree tree in trees do
24: success← BUILDFLOWGRAPH(tree.root, ICFG)






31: function BUILDFLOWGRAPH(ActionNode, ICFG)
32: Initialize FlowGraph flowgraph
33: Initialize FlowGraphNode fgnode
34: for Each child node childnode of ActionNode.children do
35: success← BUILDFLOWGRAPH(childnode, ICFG)




40: Add all nodes in childnoded.flowgraph to flowgraph
41: end for








50: for Each Definition def in instr.usedefchain do
51: Get the ActionNode setNode corresponding to def
52: setF lowGraph← setNode.flowgraph
53: Add all nodes in setF lowGraph to flowgraph
54: Set Def-Use relationship between setNode.fgnode and fgnode
55: end for
56: case Set
57: ActionNode toSet← ActionNode.child
58: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDASSIGNMENTNODE(toSet)
59: Set Def-Use relationship between toSet and fgnode








67: varMap← Associate each variable in vars with its formal parameter in
function pointed by funcName
68: for Each BasicBlock retBlock in retBlocks do
69: retActionNode← retBlock.GETLASTACTIONNODE
70: fg copy← COPYFLOWGRAPH(retActionNode.flowgraph, varMap)
71: Add all nodes in fg copy to flowgraph
72: Set Def-Use relationship between the last node in fg copy and fgnode
73: end for





. For string specific actions, refer to Appendix B







Table 2.1: Supported PHP Core operations











Table 2.2: Supported PHP string operations
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2.3.2 Array Content Propagation
In addition to being initialized directly, it is common that string literals are also declared
in arrays and maps, therefore it is important to capture all possible string literal values in
such data structures. Suppose arr is an array with n string literals in a program, and at some
point in the program, a variable a is assigned to an element in arr at a particular position i.
The actual value of a depends on index i, but in our case, what we care is all the possible
string literal values a could be assigned, and therefore index is no longer relevant. Instead,
we assume that all the n elements in arr can be assigned to a. The same idea applies for
maps as well.
Nested array and map is another consideration when extracting string literals. If an
element is retrieved by indexing into the first level of a two-dimensional array, then only
the elements at the first level are extracted. Similarly, if the array is indexed at its second
level, then only those elements at the second level are retrieved. In our implementation,
each LOAD ActionNode represents going one more level into an array/map. Therefore
a recursive array unpacking procedure is applied at LOAD ActionNodes on flow graph
construction, by which the action node can get to the correct level of an array/map and copy
all the string literals at that level into its own data structure.
2.4 Interface Discovery Algorithm
In this step, variables exposed by the application interface(input variables) are identified and
grouped logically. This part of the program implements two interface discovery algorithms






The experimental subjects used in the study is consisted of three student-developed projects
that use PHP as their back-end language.
3.1.2 Tools Used in Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our interface discovery mechanism by comparing the
number and quality of interfaces that it generates with the interfaces extracted by web
crawlers. The web crawler tool that we used is OpenWebSpider, an open-sourced framework
for crawling/spidering websites. For each interface output, we check if any of the HTTP
requests in this output is processed in the back-end program.
We evaluate the effectiveness of our test request generation mechanism by comparing it
against naive random test case generation. For each HTTP request, a set of possible values
is generated for all of the fields in this request, creating a set of test HTTP requests, which
are then sent to the server. The final code coverage of the back-end PHP code is recorded.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Email Sender
A simple PHP program that processes a form which contains 4 input fields and sends an
email according to the information supplied in the form.
Form Inputs
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• first name (required)
• last name (required)
• email (required)
• telephone (optional)
All required fields are checked against a regular expression. The only optional field (tele-
phone) is not checked against any regex or string variables.
Our penetration testing tool successfully identified all the fields (required and optional).
It generated test cases for all the required variables from the given regex expression. For
the ”telephone” field, which is optional, our testing tool did not infer any information from
static analysis, therefore would be producing random strings for this field during testing.
Code coverage achieved: 82.92%
Code coverage by random generator: 60.98%
3.2.2 Fancy Hotel (CS4400 Class Project)
A web application powered by PHP and MySQL that serves as an online room reservation





Our penetration testing tool successfully identified both username and password fields
in the interface. Since the application does not compare username and password to specific
patterns or values, our static analysis did not infer possible value information for these fields.
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However, the analyzer identified session information created during login, which could
potentially make subsequent penetration testing more thorough by exploiting user sessions.
In addition, the user login program can be redirected to three different URLs once login
information is validated. Since these URLs are not exposed to the front-end HTML, they
were not identified by web crawler. However, by performing static analysis on the source





• confirmed password (string)
• email (string)
Our penetration tool successfully identified all request (or interface) parameters and
their names (usn, psw, con pwd, email). It identified the regular expression that was used to
check valid email and username in the program and used this information to construct test
cases for the email and username fields.
Code coverage achieved: 91.67%
Code coverage by random generator: 66.67%
Room Search
Form Inputs
• start date (string)




• start date must be greater than 2015-08-01;
• start date cannot be greater than end date;
• start date cannot be smaller than today’s date (2015-08-31);
• end date must be smaller than 2016-01-31;
Our penetration tester successfully identified all the required fields as well as the session
information not exposed by the interface itself. Furthermore, static analysis has inferred
key information about both start date and end date. For start date, output test cases include
”20150831” and ”20150801”; for end date, output test cases include ”20160131”.
Code coverage achieved: 95.23%
Code coverage by random generator: 85.71%
3.2.3 Paycheck Calculator




Our penetration tool successfully identified the interface. Static analysis generated all
possible numeric values that are used, either directly or indirectly, to compare with the
interface input variable in the program.
Code coverage achieved: 85.37%
Code coverage by random generator: 82.92%
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The comparison against OpenWebSpider for interface discovery performance and naive
random string construction for test case generation shows that our penetration tool, which
is based on static analysis, could identify more web interfaces than traditional web spider
and achieve higher code coverage than traditional penetration testing tool. In our study,
we found that in the case that application hides its some of its URLs from the front-end,
web crawler is unable to discover those URLs and would fail to visit their pages. However,
there is no such problem for our penetration testing tool. Since our implementation does
not rely on front-end information when identifying interfacing but rather directly inspects
all the source codes, our interface discovery mechanism will eventually visit all the files
in the application code base and get interface information from them. Moreover, the static
analysis mechanism also helps us identify hidden URLs in the application, from which a
complete site map could be generated. However, the limitation for our penetration testing
tool is that it has to have read access of all the PHP files in use, which is sometimes difficult
to accomplish.
Another potential advantage for using our penetration testing tool is that its interface
discovery mechanism can identify which input variable is not going to be processed, thus
saving time to generate test case for it. If an input variable is never used in the back-end,
then it is not going to be identified during static analysis; however, a web crawler may
simply look at the input fields in the front end and assume that all input fields are going to
be processed.
Figure 3.1 shows our implementation for testcase generation achieves more code cov-
erage than the naive testcase generation method. The improvement is relatively big for
the first three sample programs while it is only minute for the last one. The reason is that
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the first three programs are mainly dealing with string typed inputs, as opposed to the last
program, Paycheck Calculator, which only processes integer data input. It is clear that static
analysis along with string literal value estimation makes our penetration testing tool more
capable of getting to the ”edge cases” where the program may branch out, thus is able to
achieve high code coverage by using relatively fewer test cases. Further investigation into
the implementation details of sample programs leads to the finding that the performance of
our testcase generator is higher if input variables are checked against const string literals or
regular expression patterns (program 1 and 2), and is lower if input variables are checked




In this paper we presented a novel approach for performing automated penetration testing for
PHP web applications. It uses static analysis to identify the application program’s behavior
on each variable and function, and then construct the possible interfaces exposed by the
application as well as the possible values that each request field can take. We compared the
effectiveness of this new test system with traditional penetration testing tools, in terms of
interface discovery and test case generation. The result shows our proposed testing tool can
not only identify more interfaces for dynamic web applications, but is able to achieve higher















79: ActionNode toConcat1← ActionNode.children[0]
80: ActionNode toConcat2← ActionNode.children[1]
81: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDCONCATENATIONNODE
82: Set Def-Use relationship between toConcat1 and fgnode
83: Set Def-Use relationship between toConcat2 and fgnode
84: case Comp
85: ActionNode toCmp1← ActionNode.children[0]
86: ActionNode toCmp2← ActionNode.children[1]
87: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDBINARYNODE(AssertEqualsOperation)
88: Set Def-Use relationship between toCmp1 and fgnode
89: Set Def-Use relationship between toComp2 and fgnode
90: case Substr
91: ActionNode substrNode← ActionNode.children[0]
92: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDUNARYNODE(SubstringOperation)
93: Set Def-Use relationship between substrNode and fgnode
94: case ToUppserCase
95: ActionNode upperNode← ActionNode.children[0]
96: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDUNARYNODE(ToUpperOperation)
97: Set Def-Use relationship between upperNode and fgnode
98: case ToLowerCase
99: ActionNode lowerNode← ActionNode.children[0]
100: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDUNARYNODE(ToLowerOperation)
101: Set Def-Use relationship between lowerNode and fgnode
102: case Reverse
103: ActionNode reverseNode← ActionNode.children[0]
104: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDUNARYNODE(ReverseOperation)
105: Set Def-Use relationship between reverseNode and fgnode
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106: case Trim
107: ActionNode trimNode← ActionNode.children[0]
108: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDUNARYNODE(TrimOperation)
109: Set Def-Use relationship between trimNode and fgnode
110: case Split
111: ActionNode splitNode← ActionNode.children[0]
112: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDUNARYNODE(SplitOperation)
113: Set Def-Use relationship between splitNode and fgnode
114: case StringToT ime
115: ActionNode timeNode← ActionNode.children[0]
116: fgnode← flowgraph.ADDUNARYNODE(ToTimeFormatOperation)













POST{ l a s t n a m e }
−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N122 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N124 −> N122
N123 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]




−−−−−−−−−−− T e s t Cases −−−−−−−−−−−−




POST{ t e l e p h o n e }
−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :





POST{ f i r s t n a m e }
−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N76 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
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N124 −> N76
N123 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
N124 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N123 −> N124
}





POST{ e m a i l }
−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N45 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N47 −> N45
N46 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]




−−−−−−−−−−− T e s t Cases −−−−−−−−−−−−
[ ] −S . YTh@A22 . I−P8P4G7nY0LIB.84−−−−.Mvw
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
C.2 Fancy Hotel - User Login
Found URLs :
L o c a t i o n : / u s e r r e g i s t r a t i o n . php
L o c a t i o n : / f u n c t i o n a l i t y c u s t o m e r . php
L o c a t i o n : / f u n c t i o n a l i t y m a n a g e r . php
========================================
I n t e r f a c e 1
========================================
========================================
I n t e r f a c e 2
========================================
Reques t 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
POST{ password }
T e s t Cases :
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reques t 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
POST{ username }
T e s t Cases :
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
========================================
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I n t e r f a c e 3
========================================
Reques t 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SESSION{ i d e n t i t y }
T e s t Cases :
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
========================================
I n t e r f a c e 4
========================================
Reques t 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
POST{ password }
T e s t Cases :
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reques t 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
POST{ username }
T e s t Cases :
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reques t 3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SESSION{ i d e n t i t y }
T e s t Cases :
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .




I n t e r f a c e 1
========================================
========================================





−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ S t r i n g ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N38 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
}







−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N54 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N168 −> N54
N167 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
N168 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N167 −> N168
}






−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
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d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N60 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N62 −> N60
N61 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
N62 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N61 −> N62
}





POST{ e m a i l }
−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ S t r i n g ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N74 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
}
−−−−−−−−−−− T e s t Cases −−−−−−−−−−−−
[ ] o7Muhy1@Ph . com
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∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
C.4 Fancy Hotel - Room Search
Found URLs :
========================================
I n t e r f a c e 1
========================================
========================================





−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ S t r i n g ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N38 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
}







−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N54 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N168 −> N54
N167 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
N168 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N167 −> N168
}






−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ ]
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Values : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N60 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N62 −> N60
N61 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
N62 [ l a b e l =”” , shape = c i r c l e ]
N61 −> N62
}





POST{ e m a i l }
−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ S t r i n g ]
Va lues : [ ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
d i g r a p h FlowGraph {
N74 [ l a b e l =”<???>”]
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}
−−−−−−−−−−− T e s t Cases −−−−−−−−−−−−








POST{ s a l a r y }
−−−−−−−−−− Domain I n f o −−−−−−−−−−−−
Types [ Number ]
Va lues : [ 2 3 3 1 . 8 9 , 4 6 6 3 . 7 5 , 1 3 9 9 . 1 3 , 3 7 5 1 . 0 5 ,
3 7 5 1 . 0 6 , 2 8 2 6 . 6 6 , 2 3 3 1 . 8 8 , 1 9 0 3 . 9 9 , 4 6 6 4 . 6 8 ]
S t r i n g v a l u e s :
−−−−−−−−−−− T e s t Cases −−−−−−−−−−−−
[ 2 3 3 1 . 8 9 , 4 6 6 3 . 7 5 , 1 3 9 9 . 1 3 , 3 7 5 1 . 0 5 , 3 7 5 1 . 0 6 ,
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